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This is a survey paper on recent empirical studies, based on explicit theoretical 
modelling, of product markets. — The topics covered are: 1. The relevant market 
2. The demand for products 3. Conjectural variations and market power 4. Price 
discrimination 5. Tacit collusion and the “Folk Theorem” 6. The lemons principle 






















































































































































































IN TRO DUC TIO N
In their introduction to the Journal of Industrial Economics’ special issue on “The 
Empirical Renaissance in Industrial Economics”, Bresnahan and Schmalensee (1987) 
recall that Industrial Economics started as a distinct field of economics with a series 
of book-length case studies of particular industries under the impulse of Edward 
Chamberlin and Edward Mason. The idea was that the profession would learn 
about imperfectly competitive markets by induction from an accumulation of de­
tailed studies of particular product markets. Knowledge of the facts would lead to 
theoretical hypotheses. These hopes did not materialise.
After the war, the availability of simple econometric techniques find government- 
supplied data (mainly census data) led to a long wave of studies of industry-level 
cross-section studies “testing” the structure-conduct-performance paradigm and a 
virtual disappearance of case studies. The search was for general objective rela­
tions between profits, prices, wages, and so on and market structure. In the 1970s, 
however, dissatisfaction became widespread: It was gradually recognized that these 
studies lacked sound theoretical foundations, that the industry-level data at hand 
were not appropriate and that more sophisticated econometric techniques would not 
suffice to uncover the basic truths one was looking for (see Schmalensee, 1988).
Then, in the 1980s, came the invasion of the field by game theorists. As 
a result, “Industrial Organization has become a fairly theoretical field in recent 
years. At first sight, even a theorist should regret the very high ratio of theory to 
evidence in a field in which theoretical models are often lacking in generality and in 
which practical implications are so crucial.” (Tirole, 1988, p. 3). The overflow of 
theoretical papers was perhaps an inevitable reaction. At any rate, it is beginning to 
show its usefulness for the analysis of actual markets: In the last few years, there is 
indeed an “empirical renaissance”, characterized by empirical work based on explicit 
theoretical modelling, using new sets of data (especially data on individual firms) 
and exploiting the latest advances in econometric method.
This survey is devoted to some of these new developments. As its title indi­
cates, we shall focus on studies of particular product markets and completely neglect 
papers that study multiple industries. To keep our topic within limits, we also ex­
clude agricultural products and natural resources, whether exhaustible or renewable. 
(This eliminates crude oil, but not gasoline, and does not eliminate salt, which is a 
manufactured product.)
1 THE RELEVANT M ARKET
“Let producers A and B be located in the same geographic market”. “Let producers 
A and B produce two varieties of the same product”. That is about all duopoly 
theory has to say about the market or the products for which it is supposed to be 
relevant. The determination of the real world “market” or “product” is supposed 
to be an empirical question. Yet, this determination is a condition sine qua non for 




























































































Anybody who got dirty hands trying will agree with Horowitz (1981) that “the 
market concept is indeed imprecise, and that economists are far better equipped to 
discuss markets than they are to discover them. [...] The problem of discovering the 
relevant geographic market is at least as vexing as that of discovering the relevant 
product market”. Admittedly, spatial price theory defines neat market areas for 
geographically dispersed firms. However, price discrimination allows oligopolistic 
or monopolistic firms to invade their competitor’s market areas, so that the high 
degree of overlap and cross-hauling tends to obviate the usefulness of this literature 
for practical applications. (See Elzinga and Hogarty (1973) for an early discussion, 
and Thisse and Vives (1988) for a recent game-theoretic approach.) In practice, the 
best guide is still good common sense and a detailed institutional knowledge.
Some statistical tests are available, though. They concentrate on the analysis 
of price data, since the basic principle is still Cournot’s: in a market prices should 
take the same level throughout with ease and rapidity. The problem is how to 
translate this in terms of observed prices.
A natural thing to do is to examine price correlations between varieties of the 
same (supposedly) commodity or two geographic areas. This was done as late as 1985 
by Stigler and Sherwin. The pitfalls are too numerous however. First, correlation 
may be spurious, if there is a common trend, for example. Second, small correlations 
do not imply that there is not a single market: Consider the case where the two 
prices tend to equality but may differ at any point in time. Third, high correlations 
may be observed between separate markets, for example if the price in one market 
is a ceiling to the price in the other. Clearly, the time dimension (in particular 
lagged reactions) has to be taken into account. That is why Horowitz (1981) and 
Howell (1982) use a first-order autoregressive model of the price differences allowing 
adjustment to a common long-run price.
Slade (1986), however, sees no reason to suppose that price differences are 
stable or that a particular adjustment process is followed. She proposes a test that 
is not based on a particular model of price formation but simply formalises the idea 
that two areas (or product varieties) are not common when the price in one area (or 
for one variety) is exogenous to the other.
In the simple case where there are two regions (j =  1,2), the test implies 
running the following four regressions:
nl
Pt = E  “v Pt-i + 9\ (*t) +  et (1)
*=1
n2 n3
Pt = E  Pt-i +  E  Pt-i +  02 (*t) +  v i (2)
• = 1 «=1
where j  = 1,2, fc =  2,1, eJ and rf are disturbance terms with zero means such that 
each is uncorrelated with the right-hand-side variables in its respective equation 
and Zt is a vector of exogenous variables whose exogeneity is not to be tested. The 




























































































p2 are not contemporaneously correlated and (3) the covariance between rj't and p2 
is zero. The gm (Zt) are specified els quadratic functions of time.
Slade uses this test pairwise on the wholesale prices of gasoline in cities in 
Southeastern US, the Northeast and between the East and West coasts to conclude 
that the Southeast is a local geographic market that is loosely connected to the 
Northeastern seaboard but entirely separate from the West coast.
Spiller and Huang (1986) allow to go one step further. They propose a 
maximum-likelihood methodology to estimate the probability of arbitrage and the 
required arbitrage costs for a pair of regions. Two regions belong to the same market 
if, when the price in one region exceeds the other, given prices in the two locations 
are linked by binding arbitrage conditions such that, if one price increases, arbitrage 
would take place. Arbitrage costs thus reflect the maximum differential that can 
develop between prices. When the price differential is smaller, prices can vary inde­
pendently of each other. The wholesale gasoline prices in the Northeast of the US 
turn out to be such that a) city-pairs with high probability of being in the same 
market are those that are nearby; b) city-pairs with low probabilities are more dis­
tant and c) city-pairs requiring arbitrage in a north-to-south direction have lower 
probabilities of being in the same market than city-pairs requiring arbitrage in the 
opposite direction.
Tests such as those discussed are clearly most useful to give an objective answer 
to the vexing problem, which pervades most antitrust discussions, of determining 
the relevant market.
2 THE D EM A N D  FOR PRO DUCTS
There is a long tradition in economics of estimating demand equations for specific 
products or groups of products. In the nineteenth century there was a very active 
debate over the nature of demand and little concern about its estimation. Until 
Marshall, there was considerable discussion as to the correct definition of demand for 
a single commodity. However, in the more formal literature there was convergence on 
the rather abstract Walrasian notion that demand simply represented the quantity 
that an individual would purchase at given prices which he was unable to influence. 
The subsequent theoretical literature concentrated largely on the extension of the 
analysis to interdependent markets and the problem of demand systems rather than 
single demand equations still maintaining the abstract Walrasian approach. Until 
recently, the idea that demand should be treated in this way has not really been 
challenged neither in the economic nor in the econometric literature.
Once the twentieth century literature had converged on this precise theoret­
ical definition econometricians concentrated on more sophisticated techniques for 
the estimation and identification of demand systems (for a detailed account of this 
evolution see Morgan (1990)). The agreed definition, that of competitive demand, 
concerning the quantities of goods an individual would buy at a given price were 




























































































conceptual nature of demand and supply are not questioned. The only real problem 
for him is that of which is changing.
Let us return now to the implicit assumptions underlying the usual empirical 
analysis based on Walrasian demand theory. The first of these arises if one accepts 
that the market in question can essentially be thought of as functioning “competi­
tively” . The problem is then one of identification, in this case, separating out supply 
changes from demand changes. In a truly Walrasian, or Arrow Debreu world such a 
distinction could, of course, not be made, since all transactions over time represent 
one supply and one demand decision taken in some initial period. However this 
problem is usually circumvented in the empirical literature by making an implicit 
assumption of stationarity, i.e. that the market is somehow repeated over time. This 
should, of course, be tested but does mean that one can talk of successive observa­
tions. However, in this case the appropriate theory is that referred to as temporary 
general equilibrium theory. The problem with this is that short run demand loses 
many of the properties of its Walrasian counterpart. It does not satisfy homogeneity 
or the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference for example (see e.g. Grandrnont, 1983).
However, one may also question the appropriateness of treating purchases as 
being a direct expression of competitive demand. This clearly depends on the or­
ganisation of the market. In particular, in many of the markets discussed in this 
paper, there is no obvious reason to believe that transactions reflect anything corre­
sponding to the standard theoretical idea of competitive demand. If successive lots 
of a good are auctioned, for example, there is no theoretical reason to believe that 
the average price will correspond to the competitive price that would have cleared 
the same market. There are many examples of markets in which trades are made 
after pair-wise bargaining or in which traders are dispersed geographically or have 
imperfect information. In all of these the idea of a single equilibrium price makes 
little sense.
There are further difficulties with trying to estimate empirical demand func­
tions based on standard utility maximisation. The first of these is the problem of 
aggregation. Even if individuals’ demand functions satisfy certain properties it is by 
no means necessary that these properties carry over to the aggregate level (see e.g. 
Sonnenschein, 1972, Mantel, 1976, and Debreu, 1974). Indeed there is no direct, 
formal connection between micro and macro demand behaviour without extremely 
restrictive assumptions (see e.g. Deaton, 1986). A second difficulty is that the data 
for most empirical demand estimation is not obtained at the consumer level. If 
the purchaser of a good is not in fact the final consumer then one would have to 
show that properties of individual demand carry over to properties of quantities 
purchased by an intermediary at different prices. If one considers the simple case of 
a purchaser who has a monopoly locally of the product that he buys, then it is easy 
to construct examples in which this will not be the case. This question was raised 
by Working (1927) and mentioned again in the classical studies of the demand for 
individual products by Schultz (1938), who although using individual properties of 
demand made his estimations using data for farm prices and not shop prices.
All of this suggests that one should view efforts to use empirical demand es­
timation as a way of testing specific characteristics of microeconomic utility max­




























































































(1991) show, and as one might expect from the discussion above, the track record 
of attempts to “verify” such a basic condition as the homogeneity requirement for 
demand systems is very poor. Marschak’s (1943) study of the demand for meat is 
an early example of the rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneity and increasingly 
sophisticated analysis has done little better. Yet, as Samuelson (1947) predicted, 
the consequences of this for economic theory have not been significant.
A more pragmatic approach is to look at empirically estimated “demand equa­
tions” as revealing interesting properties of consumption expenditure rather than as 
tests of particular tenets of utility theory. In particular, estimates of own and cross 
price elasticities and of income elasticies are of interest for a variety of reasons. With 
this in mind a number of recent studies are worth mentioning.
In studying the consumption of, and expenditure on tea in the U.K. using over 
sixty years of pre-war data, Nguyen and Rose (1987) found evidence of price inelas­
ticity and of steadily decreasing income elasticity. They attribute this to a variety of 
factors such as demographic and organisational changes and changes in social habits 
and point out the obvious consequences for the expansion of tea production in the 
developing countries. This study produces more evidence for one of the main ex­
planations for the apparent decline in the terms of trade of the developing countries 
that the elasticity of demand for their products is low and declining.
Another reason for being interested in demand elasticities is that, if they differ 
across groups they can be used as a basis for price discrimination, something we 
shall come back to in a later section. As an example of this, Tremblay (1985), by 
estimating a firm demand function for U.S. beer producers, was able to show the 
existence of demand asymmetries across “strategic groups” which could account for 
differences in the strategic behaviour of regional and national beer producers.
The way in which the evolution of demand for a particular product in a par­
ticular country affects the development of the producing industry is of considerable 
interest but often requires long time series. A striking example of such a study is 
Larsen and Nilsson’s (1984) examination of the production and consumption of bi­
cycles in Denmark over ninety years.They document extensively the various factors 
which have influenced the purchase of bicycles during that time and, as is some­
times the case, their historical analysis provides insights which a more sophisticated 
econometric analysis might not have revealed.
A number of policy measures depend crucially for their effect on the respon­
siveness of demand. A good example of this is the recent concern with the evolution 
of diet, its impact on health and the use of policy measures to modify that evolution. 
A series of studies, often using a rather restrictive specification for the demand sys­
tem, the so-called Almost Ideal Demand System (Aids) of Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980), has tried to analyse the nature and source of changes in the relative demand 
for meat and chicken products, Eales and Unnevehr (1988), Braschler (1983), Hal- 
dacher et al (1982), Hudson and Vertin (1985) and for food fats and oils, Gould 
et al (1991). In all these contributions the changing demographic structure seems 
to have played an important role but to what extent this is due to the differential 
impact of health considerations on different segments of the population is difficult 




























































































mentioned is that by Luttrell (1969) where demand for meat was found to be “ac­
celerating” and although costs were decreasing, both prices and consumption had 
increased. This could be claimed to provide evidence for the later shift in demand 
resulting from greater awareness of health problems in the ’80s.
One further example of an investigation of the structure of the demand for a 
particular product which has quite general implications is Planting’s (1982) look at 
the explanation for the changing seasonality in the consumption of gasoline in the 
U.S. He emphasises the importance of seasonal differences in price elasticities and 
suggests that these have been too frequently ignored in the analysis of economic 
time series.
In concluding this somewhat cursory examination we concur with Gilbert 
(1991) in suggesting that one of the important roles of empirical studies of demand 
is in measuring certain parameters, such as elasticities, and that undue priority has 
been given in the literature to the testing of often intrinsically untestable theoretical 
propositions. The very use of the term “demand” itself may have contributed to 
the sterility of the debate and may help to explain the relative paucity of empirical 
studies of the consumption of specific goods in the major economic journals.
3 CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS A N D  M AR­
KET POW ER
A “conjectural variation” is a conjecture, made by a firm, that a one unit change 
in its output leads to a change of 7 in its competitors’ total output. A value of 
7 =  — 1 indicates that the firm is a price taker, while 7 =  0 indicates Cournot 
behaviour. Collusion implies 7 =  N  — 1, where N  is the total number of firms. 
A methodology that assumes firms maximise profits under the assumption that 
their rivals will react according to their conjecture is an attempt to model dynamic 
interactions in a static framework. From a game-theoretic point of view, such a 
methodology is not satisfactory, since in a static game firms cannot react to one 
another by the very timing and information structure of the game (Tirole, 1988, p. 
244). Nevertheless, conjectural variations are often used in practice and sometimes 
interpreted as reduced form parameters1 from the equilibrium of some unknown 
dynamic game (Schmalensee, 1989, p. 650).
We wish to emphasize that, whatever their theoretical interpretation, empirical 
measures of conjectural variations have a different meaning. They do not measure 
what firms believe will happen but how firms actually behave (possibly as a result of 
their expectations). As explained in great detail by Bresnahan (1989) in his extensive 
survey of empirical studies of industries with market power, they are measuring 
departures from perfectly competitive behaviour, that is, the extent of market power. 
As such, they are directly related to the Lerner index.
Bresnahan’s argument is as follows. (We simplify his notation to abstract from 
problems of econometric estimation.) Let pt =  p(qt) be the instantaneous inverse 
market demand function, with qt =  qit (i =  1, • • •, N). Then the equality of firm 




























































































(3)P t c*t , Qiti
dpt
dqt
where cn is marginal cost. To allow for price-setting or quantity-setting conduct, 
(3) is generalised to
where 0it >  0 is a parameter that measures the competitiveness of oligopoly conduct. 
As On moves farther from 0, the conduct of firm i moves farther from the conduct of a 
perfect competitor. Particular specifications of dit correspond to particular theories. 
For example, On — 1 is implied by Cournot-Nash equlibrium in a one-shot game 
(or monopoly if there is only one firm in the market). As 6it rises, the price-cost 
margin (pt — Cn) and the Lemer index rise. During periods of collusion, 6it is larger 
than during price wars.
The crucial point is that On can be redefined as
where 7i may be a function of the firm’s own quantity, all other firms’ quantities or 
other relevant variables. Consequently, On =  1 corresponds to 7* =  0, while 7i =  — 1 
indicates perfectly competitive behaviour.
Many difficulties in the literature arise from a failure to understand the pre­
ceding argument. No harm is done when 74 =  0 is identified with Coumot-Nash 
equilibrium, or when — — 1 is called perfect competition. But what if it turns out 
that 7i =  N  — 1? This corresponds to collusive joint profit maximisation of N  iden­
tical firms and dq^dqt =  1. What is measured is the collusiveness of conduct, not 
how other firms react when firm i deviates from a collusive equilibrium. Note that, 
in a collusive equilibrium, there are no deviations: expectations about the reactions 
of other firms deter i from deviating, so that these reactions are not observed.
Geroski et al. (1985), Bresnahan (1989) and Martin (1993) discuss the estima­
tion procedures of the empirical contributions by Iwata (1974) on the Japanese flat 
glass industry, Cubbin (1975) on the U.K. car industry, Gollop and Roberts (1979) 
and Roberts (1984) on firms in the U.S. coffee roasting industry, Bresnahan (1980, 
1981) on the American automobile industry, Appelbaum (1979, 1982) on textile, 
rubber, electrical machinery and tobacco, Porter (1983b) on railroads, Spiller and 
Favaro (1984) on the Uruguayan banking sector, Suslow (1986) on aluminium, Mar­
tin (1988) on four medical-surgical supply companies and four U.S. motor vehicle 
producers and Liang (1989) for the U.S. breakfast cereal industry.
The main conclusions are that a) there is substantial market power in the 
industries studied, which are typically highly concentrated industries or markets 
with dominant firms, and b) this power results from anticompetitive conduct. These 
conclusions cannot be generalised, however. Indeed, these industries were selected 
either because cartels were known to exist or because good statistical data were 
available, which in turn may be the result of the presence of anticompetitive conduct.
(4)




























































































How the detected market power can be explained in terms of the evolution of (or 
differences in) market structure remains an open question: Here, cross-sectional 
studies in the spirit of Sutton’s 1991 book may be called for.
4 PRICE DISCRIM INATION
Price discrimination, unlike some of the topics dealt with in this survey, has given 
rise to a substantial body of empirical literature, including a number of studies 
of specific markets, and a full account of both the economic theory and details 
of business practices may be found in Phlips (1983). Price discrimination can be 
defined, in general terms, as the sale of units of goods to different customers at prices 
which differ by more than the difference in the delivered cost of those units. From a 
strictly formal point of view, such a definition is devoid of content since only units of 
a homogeneous good delivered at the same time and place are considered as the same 
commodity and therefore in a competitive framework should have the same price. 
However, in practice, a much less tight definition of good is used and, for example, 
price discrimination is said to occur if two versions of the same car are sold at prices 
which differ by more than the differences in the cost of producing and delivering those 
two versions. The practical difficulties with this are obvious and arise frequently 
when discriminatory practices Eire challenged in the courts. Returning, for a moment, 
to the strict definition, the existence of discrimination is incompatible with first best 
efficiency. The recognition of this has led to legislation (such as Article 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome) against discriminatory prEictices, particularly by “dominant” firms. 
As a result of this there is a large number of case studies of price discrimination 
in different markets. The main aim of many of these studies has been to establish 
whether in the particular case in question practices corresponding to those defined 
in law as discriminatory are present (for a discussion of this type of problem see 
Posner, 1974, 1976, and Bork, 1978). We however shall confine our attention here 
to those papers which apply economic theory, Eind particularly recent development of 
that theory to empirical markets. Furthermore not only will we consider the classic 
situation in which consumers are divided into groups according to their different 
demand characteristics and different prices are charged to different groups, but we 
will also consider cases in which firms may charge different prices to separate but 
identical groups of consumers. In the latter case the discrimination may arise from 
the structure of the supply side rather than that of the demEind side.
The stEindard classification of discrimination by a monopolist is due to Pigou 
(1932) and is based on the degree of subdivision of the market and the possibility 
of extracting consumer surplus. Another is that given by Schneider (1952) who 
distinguishes between discrimination on the basis of the type of user, the use to which 
the product is put and geographical location, chEinging by country of destination, 
for example. More recently, considerable attention has been paid to the possibility 
of price discrimination in oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive situations. 
(For theoretical analysis with a duopoly see for example Jaskold-Gabszewicz and 
Thisse, 1980, Shaked and Sutton, 1982, and for the multi-firm case Katz, 1984, 




























































































A first class of empirical contributions is that which looks at the discrimination 
between users or consumers of some good or service provided by a monopoly such as a 
public utility. The electricity industry has been the subject of extensive investigation 
in this regard. An essential problem for such an industry is that of spreading its fixed 
costs between users. Neufeld (1987) gives an account of how the demand charge rate 
structure was introduced. This principle which relates an individual’s charge to his 
own peak consumption has been considered as a misapplication of the peak-load 
pricing scheme and thus representing an inefficient discrimination between different 
users. However, Neufeld argues that it was actually sustained as a sophisticated 
system for profit maximising price discrimination in the face of competition from 
isolated plants. Eckel (1987) criticises peak-load pricing itself (see Bailey, 1972, 
Boiteux, 1949, and Wenders, 1976) and rate of return regulation as being socially 
inefficient. She claims that social efficiency requires that differences in customer 
class demand patterns be taken into account. However, it is by no means clear that 
the particular schedules actually charged to different customer classes by utilities 
achieve efficiency rather that profit maximisation, and how this should be decided 
is discussed by Eckel.
Similar problems arise in other fields and the sophisticated systems for pricing 
for telephone calls (see Billera et al., 1973) or for airport landing charges (see Lit- 
tlechild and Thompson, 1977) based on the Shapley value from cooperative game 
theory provide a “fair” attribution of overheads in determining different prices for 
the same good to different consumers. Of course, it can be argued that a landing 
by a 747 has a higher marginal cost than that of a light aircraft but there is still 
discrimination in the technical sense since the differentials in the Shapley prices far 
exceed the differences in marginal cost. In industries where marginal costs are low 
relative to fixed costs almost all solutions proposed necessarily contain an element 
of discrimination.
Another area in which price discrimination is claimed to exist extensively is 
that of international trade. Where markets can be effectively separated by legal or 
non-tariff barriers, it is common to find the same physical product being sold at 
very different prices in different markets. This has been a source of interest in the 
E.E.C. since such practices are, in principle, ruled out under the Treaty of Rome.
The pharmaceutical industry has been frequently cited as an extreme example 
of such practices. Schut and Van Bergeijk (1986) claim that there is a close positive 
correlation between per capita G.N.P. and the price charged for a given drug. Zanon 
(1981) discusses the use of discounts for large scale purchases which effectiviely allows 
companies to discriminate through exclusive importers.
A second industry which has attracted interest is automobile manufacture. 
Price differentials are maintained in many countries by the existence of voluntary 
export controls. However, even within the E.E.C. substantial differences exist be­
tween pre-tax prices for the same car. A number of explanations have been advanced 
for this. Arbitrage is by no means trivial for the individual and professional arbi­
trageurs who both import and service cars are ruled out by the exclusive dealership 
arrangement. Although simple discrimination by demand is suggested by many 
authors, Kirman and Schueller (1990) suggest that the price differences reflect, in 




























































































their own country. Thus countries with higher cost domestic producers have higher 
prices, even with identical demand. In addition, countries with no domestic produc­
ers have lower prices and pre-tax prices are lower in countries with higher taxes, a 
conclusion also reached by Murfin (1983, 1987). All this follows from the analysis of 
a simple one-shot non-cooperative game. Mertens and Ginsburgh (1985) confirm 
that price differences are not due to product differentiation but are mainly the re­
sult of discrimination. However interestingly Davidson et al (1989) show that the 
welfare effects of lowering discrimination in this market are highly ambiguous and 
this reflects other theoretical results.
A further question raised here is to what extent do car manufacturers or other 
exporters discriminate by not passing exchange rate changes through to prices. 
Mertens and Ginsburgh (1985) and Kirman and Schueller (1990) both show that 
prices do not reflect, even in the longer term, exchange rate changes and are fixed 
with respect to local cars in domestic currency terms. Knetter (1989) shows that 
both U.S. and German exporters maintain price differentials and that there is incom­
plete pass-through. All of this confirms the theoretical findings of Hens, Kirman and 
Phlips (1991) who show that, in an oligopolistic situation, exchange rate changes 
may actually result in perverse price changes, i.e. an increase in the price of the 
exports of a devaluing country. This leads to a serious problem in predicting the 
effects of a devaluation in the presence of oligopolistic competition.
In other areas also, attention has been focussed on price discrimination in 
multi-firm settings. Shepard (1991) shows how price discrimination is practised by 
service stations offering both full service and self service gasoline and suggests a 
method for detecting which part of price differences is due to discrimination and 
which to cost. Her analysis raises the question of what happens if the choice of 
full service, self service, or dual functioning is made endogenous rather than exoge­
nously given. Wolinsky (1987) gives a theoretical explanation of the empirical fact 
that manufacturers market the same good under different brand names and price 
discriminate in so doing. He cites the selling of “own brand” products by chain 
stores as an example.
An interesting example of price discrimination, which directly concerns the 
academic economist is that practiced by scientific journals. Joyce (1990) confirms an 
old argument that photocopying has increased price discrimination and shows that 
the more copied a journal is, the greater is the discrimination between institutions 
and individuals.
In concluding this section, it should be noted that there is a strong school of 
thought, represented by a recent paper of Lott and Roberts (1991), which argues 
that much of apparent price discrimination can be cost explained. Some of their 
arguments are persuasive, others less so. The observation that Consumers Reports 
finds Sears tires manufactured by Michelin of lower quality than those marketed by 
Michelin itself may, in reality, say more about the tests used by Consumers Reports 
than about product differentiation. Although these reserves should be noted, few 





























































































5 TACIT COLLUSION A N D  THE “FOLK  
TH EO REM ”
As we have said, it would not be possible to give an adequate account of empirical 
work on product markets without taking into consideration the theoretical revolution 
that has occured in recent years in the field of industrial economics. Sophisticated 
models derived from non-cooperative game theory have been developed to charac­
terise the behaviour of agents and firms in different market structures. Furthermore, 
and this is what concerns us here, the analysis has been made dynamic through the 
use of repeated games, supergames, and differential games. However, the empirical 
verification of some of the major theoretical results of the “new industrial economics” 
has developed remarkably slowly, though there are obvious reasons for this. In most 
cases the empirical testing of a theoretical proposition using a repeated game for 
example requires the use of extremely precise data on prices for a particular product 
of a specific industry. Furthermore, this data has to be collected over a relatively 
long time period. There are not many examples in the literature of the construction 
of such data sets.
To see what form empirical verification of theoretical propositions might take 
and the difficulties involved, we shall consider a standard problem, that of tacit 
collusion among producers or sellers. A standard argument has been that the exis­
tence of profits, in an oligopolistic situation, above those which would be obtained 
in the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding one-shot game, is prima facie evidence 
of collusion. Some such argument underlies much antitrust legislation, although 
the reference point, even in explicitly oligopolistic situations, is often referred to, 
misleadingly, as the “as if competitive” one. (An explicit account of the empiri­
cal problems involved in using this approach for specific markets such as that for 
synthetic fibres is given by Albach, 1977, for example.)
However, as soon as the game in question is considered in a dynamic setting, 
the theoretical basis for this conclusion is undermined by the well known “Folk 
Theorem” from game theory. Put very loosely, a version of that theorem is that 
in a stationary oligopolistic situation in which players are impatient, that is they 
discount the future, all the “cooperative” solutions of the one period game are Nash 
equilibria of the overall non-cooperative game.
There are many models which use one-shot games, but for a lot of economic 
situations these are inappropriate. The advantage of the repeated game, or in the 
case where the one-shot game changes from period to period, of the supergame 
approach, is that short-term punishments can be used to enforce more cooperative 
solutions. Thus one would observe outcomes in the dynamic approach which achieve 
better pay-offs for all parties than the security levels guaranteed at the mini max 
solution of the one-shot game. As has been mentioned, the empirical testing of 
certain characteristics of the strategies involved in markets to see whether they 
correspond to those predicted in the theory is an awesome task, if only because of 
the types of data required.
In two recent papers Slade (1991, 1992) has done this. In the first she studies 




























































































standard simplifying hypotheses used in dynamic differential games. These are that 
competition can be studied in terms of single strategic variables such as prices or 
advertising. Secondly, the class of equilibrium studied is often restricted, to Markov- 
perfect, or memory-less equilibria for example. Using modified versions of standard 
causality/exogeneity tests, she strongly rejects the strategic independence of choice 
variables. Thus it is not, as one might expect, acceptable to study competition 
from an individual choice point of view. As to the memory-less assumption, she 
finds that it is appropriate for price chosen but not for advertising. The finding for 
pricing choices is in part one of interpretation. When the lagged variables do have 
an effect this is attributed to the fact that prices are not changed in every period. 
The latter problem is a standard one in many econometric examinations of empirical 
price data. The choice of when to change prices should be made endogenously (see 
Cecchetti, 1986, for a study of the frequency of magazine price changes). Secondly, 
the discrete nature of these changes might lead one to doubt the appropriateness of 
the differential game approach.
In the second paper Slade (1992) studies price wars amongst gasoline stations 
on a stretch of highway in Vancouver. The assumptions made are that there are N  
firms selling a differentiated product, each firm i faced with a demand curve
Qit — o,t — b tp u  +  d t P ji.
All have a common discount factor d and are assumed to choose strategies of the 
form
Pit = pl + R tY l  (Pit-1  ~  Pt)< (6)
ifr
where Rt is the slope of the intertemporal reaction function and p\ the stationary 
equilibrium price corresponding to the period t parameters. If all the parameters 
were constant it is easy to see that the subgame perfect stationary equilibrium price 
for all players would be
. a + bc— (N —l ) 6 d c R  
P =  2 b - ( N - l ) d ( l + 6 R ) '
In this case with Rt — R then R  =  0 corresponds to Bertrand-Nash, while R = d =  1 
corresponds to joint monopoly or perfect collusion.2 This work is closely related to 
an earlier paper of Slade (1987) in which she came to the conclusion, using the 
same data, that the reaction function approach was more appropriate than using 
discontinuous punishment strategies.
The essential problem tackled by Slade is that of allowing for changes over 
time in the demand parameters. Thus her work differs from the literature already 
discussed in “Conjectural Variations ...” , where the models are static, the data 
corresponds to stable demand and the purpose is to test the deviation of prices 




























































































periods, “price wars”, which correspond to the triggering of punishment strategies 
and are the result of exogenous demand shocks.3
Her findings are that the parameters of firms’ strategies do change over time 
but that the process generating these changes is stationary, that firms react asym­
metrically to other firms’ price changes and finally that the steady state equilibrium 
pay-offs are above those for the Bertrand-Nash solution.
Two comments are in order. Firstly, if the distribution of the demand shocks 
were stationary, as her analysis suggests, allowing a richer strategy set might have 
eliminated price wars altogether. Thus one is led to wonder as to how much the 
results depend on that restriction. Secondly, the asymmetry of the reactions evoke 
the old “kinked demand” curve notion which, as Slade points out, has been revived 
in repeated game models by Anderson (1983) and MacLeod (1985).
Another empirical study of tacit collusion in a repeated game context is that by 
Rees (1991). He studies the salt duopoly in the U.K. in which the two participants 
have fixed capacity constraints and imports are effectively excluded. He found that 
profits were above those of the Nash equilibrium for the one-shot game and suggests 
that the strategies employed be assimilated to those involving retaliation which can 
sustain one of the equilibria of a repeated game. He rejects the hypothesis that the 
two salt firms had arrived at a Nash bargaining solution or at the joint monopoly 
solution of the one-shot game. It should be pointed out, however, that neither of 
these possibilities would be inconsistent with the Folk Theorem type of result (see 
Abreu, 1986, 1988, and Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). The problem with Rees’ 
analysis is that there are only five annual observations. Much of his discussion is 
based on additional information supplied by the report of the Monopolies and Merg­
ers Commission. He mentions that price changes were always closely synchronised, 
though neither producer was directly identified as a “leader”.
This brings us to a last observation on the problem of tacit collusion. A number 
of empirical studies have postulated the existence of a leader-follower situation. 
Two classic studies by Tennant (1950) and Nicholls (1951) of the interwar U.S. 
cigarette industry revealed a picture of fluctuating prices followed by a situation 
of price leadership and stable uniform prices. Strategic behaviour later seems to 
have been confined to advertising (see Schmalensee, 1972). A modem analysis of 
this situation would have insisted on the repeated game aspect of this situation. 
Furthermore it would point out that price leadership can itself be an equilibrium 
situation (see e.g. Deneckere et al., 1992, who introduce customer loyalty as one 
possible endogenous determinant of a price leadership equilibrium).
The same observation applies to other empirical analyses where price leader­
ship is assumed rather than explained. Examples are Merrilees’ (1983) examination 
of the Australian newspaper industry, Gisser’s (1986) study on price leadership in 
U.S. manufacturing industries, and Kirman and Schueller’s (1990) investigation of 
the European car market.
From the evidence of this section, one might be led to the conclusion that the 
Folk Theorem type of result is very negative for empirical work. Since almost any 
situation can be sustained as an equilibrium of a repeated game, and many such 




























































































be that profits should exceed those of the security level or the Nash equilibrium 
of the one-shot game where that equilibrium is unique. Thus not even joint profit 
maximisation is evidence of explicit collusion. In particular, players may be using 
very sophisticated strategies which will never actually be observed. Thus it may 
well be that the industry remains in a steady state with punishment only existing 
as a threat. The way round this in some of the papers already cited is to postulate 
external shocks which initiate changes in behaviour thereby revealing the strategies 
in use. This, however, raises the difficult question of how to distinguish between 
equilibrium strategies and adjustment to those strategies.
Although it is difficult to envisage what it is that one might observe that would 
be inconsistent with even relatively simple equilibria of a repeated or super game, 
this does not mean that we cannot learn anything from the actual outcomes observed 
empirically. A first step is to follow Slade in the papers cited and to test some of 
the simplifying assumptions used by game theorists to restrict the class of strategies 
allowed.
Secondly, from the welfare point of view, one positive aspect that might seem 
to emerge from all this is that welfare diminishing highly profitable outcomes are 
only a subset of the many possible equilibria. However, as Salop (1986) points out, 
citing several specific empirical examples, there is a growing awareness in the legal 
and in the economic literature of the existence of contractual arrangements between 
buyers and sellers to facilitate oligopolistic coordination. These arrangements may 
therefore provide evidence of deliberate collusive selection of particular outcomes, 
and this in turn may provide the empirical way to eliminate some of the excessively 
large class of solutions produced by the Folk Theorem type of result. This will, in 
turn, depend on our ability to identify econometrically particular collusive equilibria 
and a step in this direction has been made recently by Gasmi et al. (1992), using 
the soft drink market as an example.
6 THE LEMONS PRINCIPLE A N D  
EFFICIENCY
Bond (1982) provides what seems to be the first empirical test of Akerlof’s (1970) 
Lemons Principle, according to which bad products drive out good products as the 
result of asymmetric information, because buyers only know the average quality but 
not the quality of an individual product. Bond considered the (American) market for 
used pick-up trucks, because there the demand is mainly non-commercial. Trucks 
were from one to five years old, to give time for the lemons effect to occur.
The measure of quality chosen is the amount of maintenance required on a 
truck, with a lemon being a truck that requires significantly more maintenance. 
Buyers should have difficulty in evaluating future maintenance from inspecting the 
truck and the lemons principle implies that the proportion of trucks that required 
major engine maintenance should be higher for trucks that have been purchased used 
than for trucks that have been purchased new, after controlling for lifetime mileage 




























































































principle in any of the model years and equally strong support for the hypothesis 
that trucks in the used market are superior. A logit model relating maintenance 
and lifetime mileage was also estimated, but no significant differences between new 
and used trucks were found.
Two years later, Pratt and Hoffer (1984) introduced two refinements to Bond’s 
analysis. First, they notice that the survey used by Bond does not contain expen­
diture for maintenance data, so that the relative cost of repairs could not be taken 
into account: only differences in frequencies of maintenance were accounted for. 
Second, Bond treated the lemon characteristic as permanent, in that he compared 
trucks acquired new with trucks acquired used. To the contrary, a comparison of 
trucks purchased used during a specific time period with those held during that 
period (whether acquired as new or used) would capture a basic feature of a lemons 
market, namely the fact that the owner of a good-quality product is less likely to 
sell it. The latter group should contain relatively more of the good-quality trucks. 
With this sort of grouping, it is no longer necessary to correct for lifetime mileage 
or vehicle age which are known to the buyer and thus do not affect the buyer-seller 
informational asymmetry.
The appropriate test is then to check whether average maintenance expenditure 
is larger on vehicles that were recently traded within a period than on trucks that 
were not traded recently. The null hypothesis that there is no difference, that is, 
that the market for used trucks is not a lemons market, was rejected: the market 
for used pick-up trucks now appeared as a lemons market!
Bond’s reply was immediate and challenged this conclusion, criticising Pratt 
and Hoffer for throwing away information on age and lifetime mileage that is avail­
able to the buyer. Bond’s argument is this: “If 3-years old trucks with average 
usage vary widely in quality and the variations cannot be observed by potential 
buyers, then those of lower quality will obtain the same price as those of higher 
quality and adverse selection will result. However, the fact that a 4-years-old truck 
becomes too costly to operate and is sold by its owner, while a 3-years-old truck 
owned by the same owner is not, is not necessarily related to the market for lemons 
because the buyer can observe the difference in age and anticipate costlier repairs.” 
(Bond, 1984, p. 801.)
Reestimating this model using the Pratt-Hoffer definitions, but correcting for 
differences in age and lifetime mileage, Bond (1984) finds no difference in mainte­
nance for trucks less than 10 years old. But he found more frequent repairs among 
trucks more than 10 years old that have been traded recently. The differences found 
by Pratt and Hoffer thus arose from the inclusion of very old trucks in their sample 
and from their failure to control for differences in characteristics that buyers can 
observe.
Very old trucks are generally not sold by dealers, while most trucks in the 
1-10 years old category are sold by dealers. This tends to confirm Bond’s earlier 
conclusion that the absence of a lemons market can be explained by the existence 
of counteracting institutions, such as warranties, that reduce or eliminate the asym­
metry in information.




























































































equilibrium prices of consumer durables such as cars reflect all available information 
about future service flows and maintenance cost, as suggested by the user cost 
approach to the pricing of durables (see Stokey, 1981, for example). Emons and 
von Hagen (1991) test this idea for the German automobile market where public 
information about the reliability of all cars of the same vintage class and make 
is available. They find that the hypothesis that consumers rationally use public 
information cannot be rejected empirically and thus corroborate related findings by 
Daly and Mayor (1983), Hartman (1987) and Kahn (1986), who demonstrated that 
used car prices in the U.S. reflect market information about increasing energy and 
fuel cost and product recalls.4 Another finding is that, while economic depreciation 
of a new car amounts to about one third over the first two years of its life, the 
depreciation is negligible between the ages of two and four years. Novelty effects are 
completely exhausted after two years and the services of cars of these vintages are 
regarded as perfect substitutes.
The underlying theory can be summarized as follows. Utility is derived from 
the flow of services of a car rather than the car itself. Therefore demand depends 
on the user cost (rental price) of these services, which measures physical decay and 
loss of novelty effects. This cost, 7t, differs from type to type but is the same for 
all cars i of a given type. The equilibrium price a consumer is willing to pay is the 
price pu such that
7t =  Pit ~  <5 Ept 1+2 +  6 Ecu. (7)
The right-hand-side of (7) is the cost of holding a car for 2 years, which is the sum 
of the expected capital loss (pit — 5 Epu+i) and the expected cost of maintenance 
5 Ecu, where the discount factor is 6 =  (1 +  r)2.
Prices of different vintage classes of the same type are related through the 
depreciation factor pt, such that
7t =  Ptlt-2- (t =  2 ,4 ,• • • ,7 ’) (8)
Consumer expectations of the selling price obey
Epu+2 = Pt+2 +  (9)
where pt+2 is the observed current average price of all vehicles of the same type 
which are two years older than the car a consumer considers to buy. The term ejt is 
the expected individual deviation, due to the consumer’s particular way of driving 
and is zero on average. Consumer expectations of the cost of maintenance depend 
on the available public information about the reputation of the various brands and 
on regularly published official indices of technical quality. Private information again 
leads to individual deviations which sum to zero.
Under these assumptions, the structure of the observed quality indices is shown 
to induce a distribution of equilibrium capital losses and thereby of equilibrium 
prices. This is tested empirically using a regression of capital losses on the linearised 




























































































7 AUCTIO N M ARKETS
Economic theory distinguishes two polar cases: “independent-private-value” auc­
tions on the one hand, and “common value” auctions on the other hand. In the 
former, also called Vickrey auctions, each buyer is supposed to know with precision 
how much the object being auctioned is worth to him or her, but is ignorant about 
the others’ private values. The individual private values are independent and thus 
convey no information about any other buyer’s value. In common value auctions, 
the item to be auctioned has a single objective value, but no one knows it. Bidders 
have differing estimates based in part on private information but also on publicly 
available information. Recent advances in the integration of formal theory and em­
pirical analysis are most noticeable in the study of common value auctions. To these 
we turn first.
The work on US federal auctions of drilling rights on the Outer Continental 
Shelf (Ocs) is exemplary. In their 1987 paper, Hendricks, Porter and Boudreau 
collect statistical regularities about these auctions for which a very rich data set is 
available.5 These numbers provide considerable support for the assumptions and 
predictions of the first-price,6 sealed bid, common value model. Hendricks and 
Porter (1988) go one step further and build a formal bidding model with asymmetric 
information,7 whose empirical predictions are tested.
The emphasis is on “drainage sales”, that is, the simultaneous auction of tracts 
which are adjacent to tracts on which oil (or gas) deposits have already been dis­
covered, as opposed to “wildcat sales” of tracts in areas that have not been drilled. 
In the latter, information is symmetric, since bidders only have seismic information 
which has essentially the same precision across firms. In the former, firms which 
own adjacent tracts can obtain information about the drainage tract that is being 
auctioned from their own on-site drilling on neighbour tracts. A neighbour firm is 
therefore better informed than non-neighbour firms.
A naive model might predict that non-neighbour firms will not bid in drainage 
sales. If this were the case, however, the neighbour firm would correctly anticipate 
this strategy and bid the reservation price (announced by the government) when 
worthwhile. But then the non-neighbours could bid slightly more and earn positive 
profits on average. In equilibrium, therefore, non-neighbour firms must participate 
in the auction. However, since neighbour firms know their estimates of the true 
value of the tract, the non-neighbour firms must use mixed strategies (pure strate­
gies would be predictable and imply a certain loss) in order to have positive expected 
profits on some tracts. On average, though, their expected profits are zero in equi­
librium, and this condition determines the equilibrium strategy of the neighbour 
firms.
The equilibrium properties of the model imply a number of empirical predic­
tions:
1. The event that no non-neighbour firm bids occurs more frequently than the 
event that no neighbour firm bids. In fact, at least one neighbour firm par­
ticipated in 83 percent of the auctions, and at least one non-neighbour firm 




























































































2. The neighbour firm wins at least one-half of the tracts. In fact, it won 62 
percent of the tracts it bid on, paying about 56% of the ex post value of the 
tracts.
3. Expected profits to non-neighbour firms are zero. Average profit on non­
neighbour winners was in fact virtually zero. As predicted by the model, it 
was positive on tracts which received a neighbour bid and significantly negative 
on tracts which received no neighbour bid.
4. Being better informed, neighbour firms should make earnings above average. 
That is what happened.
5. If only public information is taken into account, so that tract valuations are 
symmetric, then the distribution of the bids by the neighbour firm and that 
of the maximum of the bids by non-neighbours should be approximately the 
same. Maximum likelihood estimates of the joint distribution of these bids 
confirm this.
6. The estimates also show that the informed bid (by the neighbour firm, that 
is) is essentially independent of the number of uninformed bids, as predicted 
by the model.
7. The informed bid is an increasing function of the public signal (when a larger 
signal is good news), that is, of the profitability and the value of the adjacent 
tract.
Further findings are compatible with the hypothesis that neighbour firms did 
not compete against each other. Two-thirds of the sample of drainage sales had 
multiple neighbour firms. Competition among these should have tended to elim­
inate information rents. Yet, these rents were positive and large. There were 74 
tracts with multiple neighbour firms, but only 17 tracts had multiple neighbour 
bids. Furthermore, net profits were not significantly lower on tracts with multiple 
neighbours than on tracts with one neighbour firm. Finally, bids of the neighbour 
firms are strictly decreasing in the number of neighbour firms. All this suggests that 
neighbour firms coordinated their bidding decisions and submitted one serious bid 
on tracts considered worthwhile.
Before turning to private-value auctions, a word should be said about the 
“winner’s curse” which is said to occur frequently in common auctions. One way 
of defining it is to say that the winner is nearly certain to have overestimated the 
true value and therefore to have bid too high. Some descriptive studies of offshore 
leases8 suggest that in this sense the winner’s curse does exist. This in turn suggests 
that winners were not able to correct their profit maximising bids for it, that is, did 
not optimize correctly. Consequently, to evaluate the existence of the curse and to 
evaluate the size of the overbidding empirically, there is a need for an equilibrium 
bid function that can be estimated econometrically.
Thiel (1988) works out such a function on the assumption that the winner 
overbids because he overestimates the true value (not because he overestimates the 




























































































function whose expectation, conditional on winning, is an unbiased estimate of the 
value. Thiel uses the theory of order statistics to derive a functional form that 
is linear in the parameters and estimates this by linear least squares on data for 
highway construction auctions. Unfortunately, Levin and Smith (1991) show that 
this potentially most useful approach applies only in special cases that are of limited 
practical interest and arise only under circumstances that are unlikely in the real 
world.
In the area of private-value auctions, solid links between theory and estimation 
have also been slow to emerge. Until the end of the 1980s, empirical work mainly 
aimed at testing basic rather commonsense propositions, as emphasized by McAfee 
and McMillan (1987). This may result from the fact that each prediction of auction 
theory is based on a set of restrictive assumptions, which are not likely to be satisfied 
simultaneously in reality. For example, Vickrey’s result that the expected revenue 
is the same for English, second-price sealed bid, Dutch and first-price sealed bid 
auctions9 disappears if there is risk aversion, or if the private values are correlated. 
Revenue equivalence has been tested using U.S. Forest Service sales of contracts for 
harvesting timber, since during one year both sealed bid and open auctions were 
used. Mead et aL (1981) find that sealed-bid auctions yield significantly greater 
revenue. Correcting for selection bias and making a distinction between the actual 
number of active buyers (which is known) and the number of bidders as defined 
by theory, Hansen (1985, 1986) finds that revenue equivalence cannot be rejected. 
What, however, if the valuations were in fact correlated, as is likely to be the case? 
Then theory predicts that the open auctions should have yielded the highest revenue!
Another favourite proposition is that the winning bid increases with the num­
ber of bidders. This is indeed the case in auctions for tax-exempt bonds, timber 
and off-shore drilling rights, according to Brannman et aL (1987). Note, however, 
that individual bids may decline as the number of bidders rises, if it were true that 
firms try to avoid the winner’s curse: the more bidders, the more each bidder may 
want to correct his bid downwards — see Gilley and Karels (1981), and Hendricks, 
Porter and Gertler (1986).
Several interesting issues arise that are outside standard auction theory. One 
such issue is information acquisition in auctions that are repeated. Consider the 
common case of a government procurement agency that buys equipment or awards 
projects through first-price sealed-bid auctions at regular time intervals. Typically, 
it is badly informed about the evolution of production costs and about the number 
of active bidders in any period. On the other hand, it has an incentive to buy more 
or less today, depending upon whether the current price is lower or higher than 
tomorrow’s expected price. To hold auctions frequently is a way to acquire relevant 
information. Feinstein, Block, and Nold (1985) show that bidders, once they become 
aware of this, have an incentive to collude in order to misinform the agency, thus 
skewing its intertemporal allocation to their advantage. To show this, Feinstein et 
al. first describe how the agency uses past data to improve its forecasts. They 
then show by which means a cartel can manipulate these forecasts to its advantage, 
and derive the optimal short-run and long-run cartel policy such that the cartel’s 
presence will remain undetected. It is possible for a cartel to follow a policy that 




























































































confirms its belief that it faces a competitive market! Three strategic variables 
are identified about which the cartel misinforms the government: 1) the mean of 
the sealed bids submitted by cartel members; 2) the variance of the sealed bids 
submitted by cartel members; and 3) the number of long-run market suppliers. A 
case study of highway construction contracts shows that cartels increase this mean, 
reduce this variance and reduce the number of actual bidders. The details of a 
practical procedure used to this effect by a cartel of Belgian firms that supply the 
government through first-price sealed-bid auctions can be found in Phlips (1988,
pp. 120-121).
Corresponding mechanisms used in English and second-price sealed-bid auc­
tions by cartels (called “rings”) are analysed by Graham and Marshall (1987). Inter­
views of bidders who regularly participate in rings and of auctioneers who regularly 
fight rings provided the following description of collusive behaviour: “First, a mem­
ber of a ring never enters a truly competitive bid against another ring member. 
Second, rings employ procedures that ensure that the ring will win an item more 
highly valued by a ring member than by any non-ring bidder. Third, an item won 
by a ring becomes the property of the ring itself; the ultimate ownership of the item 
is determined in a secondary auction commonly known as a “knockout”, which is 
separate from the main auction and involves only ring members. Fourth, the gains 
obtained by the coalition are shared by all ring members rather than accruing to 
only the winning bidder or some subset of ring members. Fifth, auctioneers respond 
to the presence of coalitions by establishing higher reserve prices.” (pp. 1218-19) 
The collusive strategies of the coalition are shown to represent a noncooperative 
equilibrium.10
To fight rings, auctioneers have other means. In his study of wine auctions, 
Ashenfelter (1989) notes two practices that are unexplained by auction theory. One 
is that auctioneers are very secretive about whether and at what level they may have 
set a reserve price. Another is that the identity of the purchaser is not revealed. The 
secrecy about reserve prices may serve to thwart rings: some sellers may prefer not 
to have their goods sold later rather than risk a ring bidding to depress the price. 
By not revealing the identity of the purchaser, the auctioneer creates incentives for 
the ring members to deviate from the collusive agreement.
Finally, a breakthrough on the econometric front has to be mentioned. Laf- 
fort, Ossard and Vuong (1991) developed a general simulation-based econometric 
methodology for the empirical study of theoretical auction models, both private- 
value and common-value. They apply it to daily sales on the Dutch auction of 
eggplants in Marmande, France and are able to provide estimates of the parameters 
that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values. In particular, an 
estimate is given for the (unknown) number of bidders, i.e. the size of the market, 
as opposed to the (observed) number of active participants.
8 CONCLUSION
In conluding it is worth reiterating what we said at the outset. Progress in apply­




























































































far outstripped by those developments themselves. While there are many obvious 
reasons for this, model limitations, unrealistic assumptions about consumer char­
acteristics or market structure, inappropriateness of definitions, and in particular, 
difficulties in obtaining data, none of these can justify the failure to pursue the two 
missions of empirical work, to confront the theory with the facts, and to simply es­
tablish salient facts about the way in which economies actually work. As should be 
apparent from this survey, however, there are encouraging signs of efforts to bridge 
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'Cabral (1991) shows that, in linear oligopolies and for an open set of values of the 
discount factor, there exists an exact correspondence between the conjectural vari­
ations solution and the solution of a quantity-setting repeated game with minimax 
punishments during T  periods.
"Compare the discussion in the section on “Conjectural Variations
3In her model, unlike that of Porter (1983), and Green and Porter (1984), all 
relevant variables are observable and price wars are not triggered by cheating, which 
cannot be directly detected.
4Other applications of the user cost approach include Berkovec (1985), Bresnahan 
and Yao (1985), and Wykoff (1973).
5For each tract, this set includes: date of the lease sale; location, water depth and 
acreage; which firms bid and the value of their bids; number and data of any wells 
that were drilled; and the annual production if any oil or gas was extracted. The 
drilling and production data can be used to calculate ex post value for each tract. 
Tracts are typically in a square grid pattern but vary in size.
6In a “first-price” auction, the highest bid is the price paid by the winner.
7Based on Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber (1983).
8See Capen, Clopp and Campbell (1971), Hendricks, Porter and Boudreau (1987), 
and Thaler (1988). Other studies suggest that oil firms avoid falling victims to the 
curse: see Mead et al (1984), and Hendricks, Porter and Gertler (1986). See also 
Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) on real-estate auctions.
9In an English auction the bids are publicly made and are ascending. In a second- 
price auction, imagined by Vickrey (1961), the player with the highest bid is the 
winner but pays the second highest bid. In a Dutch auction descending prices are 
announced and the winner is the first who accepts the current price.
'“See also the recent paper by Porter and Zona (1992) on detection of bid rigging 
in procurement auctions. The data indicate that the bids of non-cartel firms were 
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